

Changes without unanimous consent

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Scaling Bitcoin, 2017

Outline

- 1 Introduction
 - Approaches to change
 - Model
 - Costs
- 2 Block Commitments
- 3 BIP Commitments

Chain splits

- What's this talk really about?
 - *Consensus* changes without unanimous consent
 - Consensus changes without consensus?
 - Really about: chain split

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Unanimous consent

- If you do have unanimous consent, everything works great!
 - Developers are happy to update their software
 - Changes are clearly specified, and make sense
 - People running nodes are happy to deploy it
 - No security holes, upgrade challenges, extra costs
 - Miners are happy to deploy and signal
 - No hits to profit, no PoW on old chain, no split!
 - Economy is happy to maintain and increase value
 - Step 4: ... PROFIT

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Scaling and disagreements

- But that only works if everyone agrees, and growth makes agreement less likely
 - Disagreements over goals
 - eg, government buys into Bitcoin, then wants to make it hard for criminals to use by reducing anonymity
 - Unclear what the impact of a change will be
 - Perfect knowledge might imply consent, but what if some people just don't see it?
 - Non-Pareto improvements
 - What if someone is actually made worse off? Perhaps an upgrade makes some mining hardware less efficient...
 - Implementation bugs
 - More developers = more bugs? More developers = more bugs *found*?
 - Strategic disagreements

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Splits are cheap

- Splitting is cheap
 - change a few lines of code
 - change the proof of work rules
- No matter how undesirable it is, you can't stop it.
- So saying “Bitcoin is great as is – let's not change anything” isn't a solution either.

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Easy changes

- *Uncontroversial* soft-forks
- Simple, *uncontroversial*, emergency hard-fork
- Long-buried, *uncontroversial*, hard fork
- All of these work great!

Everything else

- Contentious hard-forks
 - People want to maintain unupgraded chain
 - → SPLIT
- Quick hard-forks
 - People don't have time to upgrade
 - Un-upgraded nodes run un-upgraded chain
 - → SPLIT
- Contentious User-activated Soft-forks
 - Un-upgraded chain remains viable
 - People still want it
 - → SPLIT

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Who decides what we get

- Core developers?
 - If it's controversial, devs will disagree too
 - And they don't want to decide anyway
- Miners?
 - If everyone decides to defer to them, sure! (BIP9, etc)
 - If not, probably not
 - We'll get more data in a couple of weeks!
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Who decides what we get

- The Economy
 - Provides the reason devs work
 - Either philosophically, or the paycheque
 - Pays miners
 - Block rewards only let you pay for electricity if Bitcoin has value

How does the economy decide

- The economy gives a value for Bitcoin
- That is, will trade Bitcoin for goods and services
 - Buy Bitcoin — give goods/services, get Bitcoin
 - Sell Bitcoin — give Bitcoin, get goods/services
- One way or another, the economy wants some sort of market in order to exercise its power

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Change, or don't

- What are we talking about?
- Someone proposes a change
 - ...to consensus rules
 - Specific and explicit about what changes
- Everyone adopts the change
 - Release new versions of software
 - Update nodes
 - Care about who owns how much according to the new rules
- Or nobody adopts the change, and stick with the current rules
- Or some people do and some don't

Price formula

- Someone proposes a change, what's the expected value of the coin now?

$$c = p_{\mathcal{N}} \cdot a + p_{\mathcal{E}} \cdot b + p_{\mathcal{S}} (\alpha + \beta)$$

Trading coins

- Can gain pricing information by trading coins (atomic swaps, BitFinex markets, etc)
- Three types of markets:
 - Unconditional: someone gets coins on old chain, other person gets coins on changed chain
 - Split or refund: trade only takes place if a split occurs (refund if there's only one chain, whichever that is)
 - Activation or refund: trade only takes place if the changed rules activate (refund if only the old chain works)

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But!

- But three markets and our expected value equation¹ gives us five equations...
- ...in seven unknowns
- So this is only enough to give us values for
 - $(p_{\mathcal{N}} \cdot a)$, $(p_{\mathcal{E}} \cdot b)$, $(p_{\mathcal{J}} \cdot \alpha)$ and $(p_{\mathcal{J}} \cdot \beta)$
- But is one of those figures low because:
 - that chain would not be very valuable?
 - or just because it's not likely to exist?

¹and $p_{\mathcal{N}} + p_{\mathcal{E}} + p_{\mathcal{J}} = 1$

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Prediction market

- A prediction market can solve this and give values for the probabilities
- But not if it's denominated in Bitcoin
 - ...and probably not if it's in any other cryptocurrency
 - (unless it's one that's not correlated with Bitcoin's value)

Lack of price discovery

- What happens if you don't have these sorts of markets?
- Suppose everyone knows that a split is coming: $p_{\mathcal{S}} = 1$ and $c = \alpha + \beta$
- But there isn't a good market price for α and β (or $p_{\mathcal{S}}\alpha$ and $p_{\mathcal{S}}\beta$)
- Then different people can have different values for α and β — $c = \alpha_1 + \beta_1 = \alpha_2 + \beta_2$ with $\alpha_1 > \alpha_2$ and $\beta_2 > \beta_1$
- And after the split, people with higher values for α will buy the old chain and vice-versa
 - Leading to a price rise — $c' = \alpha_1 + \beta_2 > c$
 - ... like we got when Bitcoin Cash forked

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Splitting is expensive

- Splitting the chain has lots of negative externalities
 - Updating wallets, miners, node software
 - P2P confusion
 - Miners need to choose which chain to mine
 - Exchanges need to add new tokens, futures, ...
 - Dumb contracts have to be updated
 - People have to pay on-chain fees to rebalance
 - People get confused

Splitting is expensive

- Maintaining the PoW algorithm is expensive
 - and also somewhat quantifiable!
- The first blocks until retarget have to be mined at old difficulty on both chains
 - receiving about $2016 \times 12.5 \times (\alpha + \beta)$ in value for $2016 \times 2 \times d$ work
 - vs $2016 \times 12.5 \times a$ value for $2016 \times 1 \times d$ work
- For a given amount of hashpower, potentially a loss of an entire two week's mining revenue

Subsidising miners is expensive

- If the PoW rules aren't changed, miners will strongly prefer the higher valued chain
- So to sustain the lower value chain until the value vs difficulty ratios equalise, subsidies are needed
 - eg, transactions paying higher fees, off-book payments to miners, miners not optimising for short-term profit
- These aren't cheap — can cost over 20,000 BTC if one chain is worth less than a quarter of the other

Replay protection

- First step to making chain splits not horrible: prevent replay
- Ideally, do this generically, so that neither chain has to admit to “causing” the split by implementing replay protection
- Ideally, get it implemented in core, so that whenever someone random causes a chain split, everyone gets replay protection for free
- If selling coins is easy, coins causing split have low expected value, so splits aren't profitable, and happen less?

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Transactions commit to block history

- An obvious way of preventing replay is for transactions to commit to a particular block being in the history.
- BIP 115 proposes OP_CHECKBLOCKATHEIGHT
- Side benefit: makes recovering from some double spends easier, even without consensus changes
- Has the disadvantage that you need to explicitly specify the block hash (or at least the ending bytes thereof)
- Requires two transactions to actually split the coin

Signatures commit to block history

- Instead of having an opcode, have a `SIGHASH_BLOCKCOMMIT` flag.
- Allow specifying a block as part of the signature
 - 2 byte `nHashOffset` in the signature, `nLockTime` from the transaction,
 - block height is $nLockTime - nHashOffset$
- Add the given block height's hash when calculating the hash to sign (as well as `nHashOffset`)
- If `nHashOffset` is zero, use the genesis block to make locking a transaction to testnet or litecoin easy too

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Benefits

- Can handle a chain split with just two pieces of information:
 - The height at which the chain split
 - The hash of the first block on your preferred chain
- Replay protection: just always commit to that block (or one after it) when signing transactions
- Wipeout protection: checkpoint that block, and don't let it to be reorged
- Easy to do even with SPV/light clients

Additions

- BIP 115 proposes only verifying block history back to about 52000 blocks
- This way clients don't need to have even the complete set of block headers available to verify signatures
- Can more or less duplicate this by allowing the signature to specify the block hash explicitly:
 - Add the block hash to the signature, an extra 32 (or fewer) bytes of witness data
 - Require the specified block hash to match the actual block hash at the given height (if known)
 - If the block being referenced is 52000+ blocks deep require the signature to specify the block hash

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Additions

- What happens if there's an orphan block?
- Maybe some transactions were signed depending on the block and become invalid
 - What if those transactions paid you, and you already spent them? Argh.
- So perhaps add a rule:
 - $nHashOffset > 100$ — consensus rule, transactions are only invalidated if there's a huge reorg or there's a consensus split;
OR
 - $nLockTime - nHashOffset + 100 < tip$ — standardness rule, transactions in mempool won't be invalidated but transactions in a block might be

Replay protection \neq Price discovery

- That's great for replay protection
- But it doesn't really let you do price discovery in advance of a split.
- You can't commit to a trade until the first forking blocks are mined

Commit to a BIP

- Instead of committing to a block hash, commit to a BIP's activation status
- Same approach:
 - SIGHASH_BIPCOMMIT flag
 - Need a couple of bytes to specify a BIP
 - Also need a bit to specify whether the BIP should be active in inactive
- Does require implementations to have a BIP number assigned, and does require them to code that BIP number in their implementation.
 - But segwit2x doesn't have a BIP.
 - Well, they have BIP32.

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Making this soft-fork compatible

- But what about soft-fork upgrades?
- Version 0.19 comes out with BIP365 via UASF.
- Everyone agrees that BIP365 support is essential.
 - Market valuation: cost of a pizza will be 20,000 non-BIP365 coins!
- BIP365 is activated.
- You make a transaction signed with `SIGHASH_BIPCOMMIT` 365 active.
- If someone is still running 0.18 do they see your transaction as valid?
 - No? Then it's not a soft-fork
 - Yes? How does 0.18 know BIP 365 is active when it wasn't even written yet?

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- Version 0.19 comes out with BIP365 via UASF.
- Everyone agrees that BIP365 support is essential.
 - Market valuation: cost of a pizza will be 20,000 non-BIP365 coins!
- BIP365 is activated.
- You make a transaction signed with `SIGHASH_BIPCOMMIT`
365 active.
- If someone is still running 0.18 do they see your transaction as valid?
 - No? Then it's not a soft-fork
 - Yes? How does 0.18 know BIP 365 is active when it wasn't even written yet?

Still able to be messed with

- If an implementation knows (and implements) the BIP's rules, everything is fine.
- If it doesn't, it needs to track unknown BIPs by what signatures they see:
 - If a block includes a signature saying a BIP is activated, then
 - no other transaction in the block can assert it's inactive
 - no transaction in any later block can assert it's inactive
 - If a block includes a signature saying a BIP is inactive, then
 - no other transaction in the same block can want it to be active
- But this would let miners confuse things:
 - BIP 720 is written and sounds good to miners, but isn't implemented anywhere
 - Miners mine a few transactions with SIGHASH_BIPCOMMIT BIP720 active
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Limited protection

- Can fix this by having implementations update regularly, and forbid activation of unknown BIPs while they're current.
- 0.18 comes out: for six months, it rejects any block that contains a transaction with a signature requiring any unknown BIP to be activated; but then relaxes this rule.
- Six months after 0.18 comes out, 0.19 comes out: for six months, it similarly rejects commitments to unknown BIPs being active
- And so on.

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- Properties:
 - Unknown BIPs are rejected by current versions of node software at all times
 - New BIPs are allowed by the latest updates (which know about them) and older versions (because they've relaxed the rules)
 - Software releases must be somewhat regular
 - Though only need a minor release bumping the timeout
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Price discovery via BIP commitment

- This is enough to establish Bitcoin-vs-Bitcoin markets
- Which is enough to establish conditional valuations (ie, $p_{\mathcal{N}}a$, $p_{\mathcal{E}}b$, etc).
- It can be done mostly trustlessly
- Markets offering a refund need some way to distinguish whether alternative consensus rules have activated or a chain split has occurred:
 - Trusted oracle
 - Crypto proof of split/activation
 - Economic incentive — each participant puts up a ransom, r , which they lose if they lie
 - Provided the other chain is worth $f(r)\%$ of this coin's value, cheating isn't profitable
- No need for a trusted exchange, however!

Conclusion

- Consensus on consensus is hard, and getting harder.
- Splits are easy.
- We can make splits hurt less.
- We can let the economy make better decisions on splits.
- Thanks for listening!