

*Scaling Bitcoin workshop, Sept. 2015*

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# Issues impacting Block Size proposals

Jeff Garzik  
Dunvegan Space Systems /  
BitPay

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# History

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
- ❖ Bitcoin introduced as P2P electronic cash payments
- ❖ 1M block size hard limit set for anti-spam purposes
  - ❖ Otherwise, trivial to create 32M+ blocks at low cost

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# Observations - System


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- ❖ Process of finding distributed consensus takes time
  - ❖ Bitcoin is a *settlement system*
  - ❖ Settles on a stable timeline of transactions
- ❖ Core service: **Censorship Resistance**
  - ❖ Enables permission-less innovation



*Average Block Size*

For all time



*Average Block Size*

Year 2015

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# Observations - Block Size

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- ❖ Provides DoS protection. Raises Cost-Of-Attack.
- ❖ 250k soft limit: 0.1.0(?)
- ❖ 350k soft limit: 0.8.6 (Dec 2013)
- ❖ 750k soft limit: 0.9.0 (March 2014)
- ❖ Trend: Headed towards 1M hard limit
- ❖ Blocks not full today\*
  - ❖ \*Excluding long blocks, stress tests

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# Observations - Fee Market

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- ❖ Zero fee competition\*
  - ❖ \*On average. Excludes long blocks, traffic bursts (stress tests), short periods prior to soft limit increase.
- ❖ Fee floor set by anti-“dust” relay limit
- ❖ Fees provide near-zero economic signaling today
  - ❖ Users: Fee choice depends on TX size and block size
    - ❖ Difficult to reason
  - ❖ Miners: Fees unpredictable; below noise level vs. 25 BTC subsidy

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# Observations 3

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- ❖ Non-contentious hard fork: User voting mechanism
  - ❖ Check-and-balance
- ❖ Natural equilibrium block size exists, in absence of limit
- ❖ Rapid miner, mining pool turnover YoY
  - ❖ Permission-less miner entry

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# Problems 1: Wall at 1M

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- ❖ Major economic policy shift, to fee competition
- ❖ Users, markets, software not prepared
  - ❖ UX rapidly degrades; erratic confirm times, fees.
  - ❖ Stress tests did force wallet authors to improve
- ❖ Market chaos as fees shift to new, higher equilibrium
- ❖ Event driven, not time driven (might precede HK)
- ❖ Businesses, users incentivized away by high fees

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# Problems 2 - High Level

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- ❖ Stuck at 1M strangles bitcoin growth and adoption
- ❖ “Fidelity Problem”
  - ❖ Capacity projections impossible
  - ❖ Business plans never implemented
  - ❖ No user & traffic growth b/c few will build on BTC
    - ❖ Block size problem solves itself

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# Problems 3 - High Level

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- ❖ Bitcoin built to be upgraded - must not get stuck at v1
- ❖ No good way to measure community opinion on blksize
- ❖ Getting stuck at 1M, due to hard fork contention
- ❖ Not thinking of the user & market experience
  - ❖ Fee market abruptly appears at 1M
    - ❖ Users not informed / prepared for new econ. policy
  - ❖ “Restore minimum feerate to 10000 satoshis” #6201

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# Problems 4 - Fee Market

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- ❖ Market disruption upon shift to blocks-full-on-avg
  - ❖ Even worse: Not full(1M) - full (1M) - not full (2M)
- ❖ Zero fee competition
  - ❖ Moral hazard: Unsustainable long term(?)
    - ❖ Users hooked on low fees
  - ❖ Valid economic choice: subsidize adoption today

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# Problems 5 - Limit Increase Has Costs

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- ❖ Hard fork required\*
- ❖ Larger blocks push miners, nodes off system
- ❖ System security may be impacted
- ❖ Increased network load shouldered by ever-fewer actors

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# Problems 6

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- ❖ Avoid high priests choosing magic values like 1M
- ❖ Avoid user cliffs (abrupt, large changes to market)
- ❖ “inv” storm response - Need BitTorrent-like throttling
- ❖ Centralization at low end (1M) and high end (1G)
- ❖ **Lack of data, field experience** on block size changes
  - ❖ Community likes safety rails
  - ❖ Simulations only go so far

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# Simulation variables

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- ❖ L - Lightweight node count
- ❖ P - Pruned node count
- ❖ F - Full node count
- ❖ C - CPU cost for P, F to validate blocks
- ❖ D - Data storage costs
- ❖ N - Network resource cost for P / F relaying + L usage

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# Problems 7 - analysis errors

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- ❖ Discounting or not seeing externalities
- ❖ Miners always maximize for fees
  - ❖ “If no size limit, miners never refuse a transaction”
- ❖ Miners must be profitable in the short term
- ❖ Possibility of selfish mining implies broken system

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# Observations

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- ❖ Static, one-time increase: Need more forks later
- ❖ Static increase schedule: Might be too big or too small
- ❖ Feedback based: Reflects market; Possibly game-able
- ❖ Pay to future miner: Interesting
- ❖ Pay with difficulty: Scrambles incentives

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# Observations

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- ❖ Prediction: 2nd “course correction” hard fork likely
- ❖ Do not plan, engineer too far into the future
- ❖ All The World’s Coffees will not fit on blockchain
- ❖ Limit increase needed to standard payment growth
- ❖ Limit increase also needed for payment channels, Lightning, side chains, other scaling methods.



*Fini*

Liberté, égalité, fraternité

[JGarzik@DSS.co](mailto:JGarzik@DSS.co)

[JGarzik@BitPay.com](mailto:JGarzik@BitPay.com)